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the abCs of goveRning the himalayas in  
Response to glaCial melt: atmospheRiC bRown  
Clouds, blaCk CaRbon, and Regional CoopeRation
by Erwin Rose*
InTroducTIon
Despite their awesome grandeur, the Himalayas are fragile. The melting of the glaciers as a result of global climate change has emerged as an impending 
crisis. How can governments in the Greater Himalayan Region 
(“GHR”) respond most effectively to glacial melt (“GM”)? The 
elementary principles (“ABCs”) of international environmental 
law and policy (“IELP”) can provide guidance to those who seek 
to reduce further loss, and adapt to the consequences of what 
cannot be prevented.
The GHR, for the purpose of this study, includes the Himalayas, 
Hindu Kush, Karakoram, Kunlun Shan, Pamir, Tian Shan and 
Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau and the river basins originating in these 
mountains.1 Defined as such, the area encompasses parts 
of sixteen countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Myanmar, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
and Vietnam.2 The size of the GHR and the influence of its 
glaciers make it a system of global significance. Some refer 
to the mountains as “the Third Pole” because they contain 
the third largest glacial mass on Earth (after the polar 
regions).3 Their high-altitude topography influences atmo-
spheric warming and circulation4 and the albedo (reflective 
power of the snow and ice) of the mountains plays a role in 
regulating regional climate and global climate.5
The mountains affect water availability in the region 
not only directly through melt that feeds the rivers, 
but also via precipitation, particularly seasonal mon-
soons.6 These glaciers supply the headwaters of the ten 
largest Asian rivers including the Brahmaputra, Ganges, 
Indus, Mekong, Yellow, and Yangtze, all of which cross 
national boundaries.7 In this way, the glaciers function 
as the “water tower of Asia” with roughly 500 million 
to 1.3 billion people living in the GHR watersheds and 
relying upon these rivers for drinking water, irrigation, 
fisheries, hydropower and other services.8 While these 
communities are separated by rugged physical landscapes 
and national boundaries, they are united by their depen-
dence upon the glaciers.9
Due in part to rapid climate change, the fate of these 
glaciers and the water resources they provide, are in peril. If 
glacial loss continues at its present rate, the GHR would expe-
rience more floods and ultimately a reduced water supply.10 
This article summarizes existing scientific research, revealing 
the extent to which glacial melting—the reduction of ice, 
snow and permafrost in the glaciers—is occurring, as well as 
the subsequent causes and impacts. It considers the problem 
from the perspective of international environmental law and 
policy (“IELP”) and reviews existing international IELP tools 
that could mitigate this dire issue.11 Specifically, the article 
highlights the potential for implementing air quality initiatives 
to slow melting and for regional cooperation to stimulate more 
effective responses to this looming threat to the region’s people 
and environment.
Map 1: Credit: Riccardo Pravettoni, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 
http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/recent-flood-events-in-
the-hindu-kush-himalaya-region_187f.
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assessIng hImaLayan gLacIaL meLT
extent and Rate of glaCial melting
In January 2010, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”) retracted a statement discussing the disappear-
ance of Himalayan glaciers from a 2007 report that read: “the 
likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps 
sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current 
rate.”12 Despite this retraction, the preponderance of evidence 
shows that the glaciers are melting across the world. A study led 
by glaciologist Shichang Kang and associates at the Institute of 
Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences found: 
“Since the 1990s the majority of glaciers have retreated rapidly 
. . . Recent research showed that more than 80% of glaciers in 
western China have retreated, losing 4.5% of their combined areal 
coverage [over approximately the past 50 years] . . . .”13 Climate 
and Atmosphere scientist Veerabhadran Ramanathan concluded 
that the glaciers feeding the Indus have retreated by 35-50 % since 
the 1930s, the main glacier feeding the Ganges “is retreating more 
than 35 m [meters] per year, nearly twice as fast as 20 years ago,” 
and the Tibetan glaciers “are melting at an accelerating rate and 
two-thirds could be gone by 2060.”14 Furthermore, according to the 
U.S. National Aeronautic and Space Administration (“NASA”), 
“since the early 1960s, the acreage covered by Himalayan glaciers 
has declined by over 20 percent.”15
Causes of glaCial melting
Many analysts assume that GM is caused directly by global 
warming from greenhouse gas emissions.16 However, recent 
research paints a more nuanced picture. Ramanathan et al. con-
clude that “atmospheric brown clouds” (“ABCs”) consisting of 
aerosols, particularly black carbon soot, may be as significant as 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) as a cause of the decline in glacial 
mass.17 As Kang et al. summarize the causation:
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are generally 
considered as the main cause of the climate warming in 
the TP [Tibetan Plateau], and impacts there are prob-
ably more serious than the rest of the world. However, 
other confounding factors, such as changes in cloud 
cover, snow/ice-albedo feedback, the Asian brown 
clouds and land use changes, also contribute to recent 
climate dynamics in the TP . . . . 18
NASA’s research also indicates “that soot and dust contribute 
as much (or more) to atmospheric warming in the Himalayas as 
greenhouse gases . . . The brisk melting coincides with the time 
when concentrations of aerosols like soot and dust transported 
from places like India and Nepal are most dense in the atmo-
sphere.”19 Further analysis reveals that two-thirds of the black 
carbon particles in South Asia may come from burning biomass 
(cookstoves, slash and burn agriculture and waste disposal), 
with the remaining third resulting from fossil fuel combustion.20
ConsequenCes of glaCial melting
The loss of ice and snow in the Himalayas is increasing 
flooding (particularly glacial lake outburst floods) and landslides, 
which could severely decrease the quality of and access to water 
resources, agriculture, fisheries, energy, industry, migration, 
and could further exacerbate global climate change.21 Kang 
et al. point to “[h]ydrological changes resulting from glacial 
retreat, such as increased discharge, rises in lake level, more 
frequent glacial lake outbursts leading to flooding, enhanced 
glacial debris flows, and changes in water resources . . . .”22 Lester 
Brown, founder of Worldwatch Institute and now President of the 
Earth Policy Institute, emphasizes the impacts upon agriculture 
and food security: “The world has never faced such a predictably 
massive threat to food production as that posed by the melting 
mountain glaciers of Asia.”23
There are significant variances in the extent to which each 
river in the region depends upon the glaciers, and therefore there 
are differences as to which regions will be hit hardest. The Indus 
(44.8%) and the Tarim (40-42%) receive by far the greatest 
percentage of their flow from melted glacial water.24 Figures for 
the Ganges (9.1%), Yangtze (18.5%), and others are much lower; 
only 1.3% of the Yellow River’s volume is from the glaciers.25 
Given these disparate impacts, the GM consequences on weather 
patterns, where effects are diffuse, though also substantial, are 
much more difficult to assess.26
But GM is only one aspect of the changes underway in the 
region’s water systems. The World Meteorological Organization 
(“WMO”) finds that the devastating flooding in China and 
Pakistan in summer 2010 was likely the result of climate change-
exacerbated monsoons.27 GHR water supplies face other threats, 
particularly from population growth, unsustainable consumption 
rates, pollution, hydropower, and dams.28 Climate change and 
GM are not only threats to water resources but also exacerbate 
the impacts of other threats to a stable regional water supply.29
appLyIng InTernaTIonaL envIronmenTaL  
LaW and poLIcy
goveRnanCe peRspeCtive
The transboundary nature of the Himalayan ecosystem, 
along with its remote and inaccessible terrains, accounts for 
much of the lack of adequate investment in response to GM.30 In 
order to resolve a transboundary issue, it is necessary to adopt a 
governance approach that effectively captures the dynamic inter-
actions of norms and structures, including varied approaches to 
law and government.31 The “New institutionalism” perspective 
emphasizes the role of institutions in governance. Considering 
institutions as “clusters of rights, rules, and decision-making 
procedures” provides a framework on which organizations, as 
parts of broader regimes, can foster multi-layered coordination 
on problems such the collective action dilemma, tragedy of the 
commons, and market failure that exacerbate transboundary 
environmental problems.32 Under this new institutionalism 
framework, various stakeholders can develop sophisticated 
strategies to overcome cultural, physical, and political barriers to 
confronting the shared threat of declining glaciers.
These successes are evidenced by findings that tragedy 
of the commons and game theory experiments move toward 
more positive outcomes when opportunities for dialogue are 
provided.33 International relations scholar Robert Keohane and 
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his associates argue that “effective environmental institutions” 
influence policy in three main ways: “They can contribute to 
more appropriate agendas . . . comprehensive and specific inter-
national policies . . . through intergovernmental bargaining; and 
. . . national policy responses which directly control sources of 
environmental degradation.”34 Another recent study on water-
related threats in the area emphasizes the need for more coherent, 
region-wide, long-term systemic planning and coordination, 
calling for a “cross-regional humanitarian policy-maker/science 
dialogue” and “greater sharing of scientific information amongst 
countries in the region.”35 It seems clear that regional cooperation 
mechanisms provide the potential for tackling Himalayan GM.
CoRe pRinCiples and Relevant instRuments
The international nature of the causes and consequences 
of glacial retreat fall squarely within the realm of existing 
IELP, including a wide range of legal and policy instruments. 
Commonly accepted core legal principles of environmental gov-
ernance can be useful in guiding national policy responses and 
advancing domestic interests, even if governments do not place a 
high priority on compliance with international law.
Examples of these core principles are ever-present in IELP. 
The principle that nations have a responsibility to prevent harm 
to others from transboundary pollution has become an estab-
lished principle of international law.36 IELP has also developed 
standards of due diligence, including environmental assess-
ments, that guide sound environmental policy.37 The duty 
to cooperate is also a fundamental principle of international 
law.38 The Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment, the Rio UN Conference on Environment 
Declaration, and Agenda 21, as well as other precise legal instru-
ments, all elaborate upon these concepts.39 Other generally 
accepted principles inform policy on GM, such as sovereignty 
over natural resources, common but differentiated responsibility, 
the polluter pays, and the precautionary principles.40
There are also several binding multilateral environmental 
agreements that apply to issues related to Himalayan GM including 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention and Statute 
on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern, 
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.41 
Further, there are a myriad of nonbinding instruments that could 
provide guidance, such as the Stockholm and Rio statements, 
Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development Plan 
of Implementation,42 World Charter for Nature,43 United Nations 
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) Draft Shared Resources 
Principles,44 and UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental 
Impact Assessment.45 And while the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses is 
not in force, it nonetheless reflects international consensus on 
the protection and governance of transboundary freshwater 
resources.46 Given the abundance of relevant IELP instruments, 
regional, national, and local policies Governments and civil 
society actors in the regions would benefit if they apply these 
international instruments and principles to facilitate regional and 
international cooperation to mitigate Himalayan GM and adapt 
to the impacts that are already underway.
CoopeRation meChanisms in otheR Regions
Instructive models can also be found via the intergovern-
mental mechanisms for other geographic regions, including the 
Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization,47 Arctic Council,48 
and UNEP’s Regional Seas Program.49 Europe has made progress 
on air quality through the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(“UNECE”) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution.50 One scholar recommends that Himalayan countries 
look at the UNECE Helsinki Convention (on the Baltic Sea)51 
and the Zambezi River agreements52 as models that provide a 
more concrete example of transboundary water management 
that could inform arrangements in the GHR.53
The Alpine Mountain Convention is a noteworthy example 
of cooperation within mountain regions. The Alpine Convention 
(“AC”) commits parties to “a comprehensive policy for the pres-
ervation and protection of the Alps by applying the principles of 
prevention, payment by the polluter . . . and cooperation . . . .”54 
The AC requires the parties to take “appropriate measures” in 
twelve areas including regional planning, air pollution prevention, 
water management, transportation, and energy.55 The AC also 
contains commitments on “research and systematic monitor-
ing” and “legal, scientific, economic and technical cooperation” 
and provides a structure for regular meetings to coordinate its 
implementation.56
In addition to emphasizing a responsibility to prevent 
pollution and to cooperate in the stewardship of shared natural 
resources, the multilateral instruments and regional mechanisms 
mentioned above provide a dedicated international forum for 
governments, and sometimes even other stakeholders, to engage 
in dialogue and collaborative activities, guideline assessment, 
notification, consultation, and dispute resolution.57 These 
existing regional structures can provide the guidance needed 
for implementation of these international practices to prevent 
Himalayan GM.
existing meChanisms in the Region
The organization that stands out as the best-designed to 
support regional work on Himalayan GM is the International 
Center for Integrated Mountain Development (“ICIMOD”). 
ICIMOD’s principal objectives are to “help promote the devel-
opment of an economically sound mountain ecosystem and to 
improve the living standards of the mountain populations of the 
Hindu Kush-Himalayan region.”58 It describes itself as “an inde-
pendent inter-governmental centre that is a regional facilitator 
and broker with a mountain perspective.”59 Eight governments 
participate in ICIMOD: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan.60 Its governing 
board is composed of representatives of the eight “regional 
member countries” and six additional, independent members 
nominated by donors.61
ICIMOD’s budget, $11.7 million in 2009, mostly comes 
from European governments and international organizations62 
and enables the organization to foster scientific and technical 
cooperation and raise awareness about a wide range of devel-
opment challenges, including GM.63 ICIMOD’s herculean task 
was noted by an international meeting of GM scientists in 2008, 
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which described ICIMOD’s work as the “tricky scientific—and 
diplomatic—task of mapping glacial retreat in the world’s 
highest mountains.”64 With relatively low funding levels given 
its wide scope, the ICIMOD is surprisingly influential yet still 
very limited in its ability to make large-scale progress toward 
accounting and mitigating Himalayan GM.65
Another intergovernmental organization, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (“SAARC”), comes 
next closest to matching the set of countries in the GHR.66 The 
SAARC member states are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.67 SAARC 
granted China observer status in 2005, but news reports indicate 
that India has blocked China’s pursuit of SAARC member-
ship.68 SAARC fosters primarily intergovernmental cooperation 
on a wide range of issues including a number of areas related 
to GM.69 For example, SAARC established a meteorological 
research center in 199570 and supported UNEP’s South Asia 
Environment Outlook 2009.71
Several international partnerships and organizations are 
also working to prevent and reduce GM impacts. The Mountain 
Partnership fosters links between existing mountain sustainable 
development mechanisms, such as the Alpine Convention, and 
has recently taken preliminary steps to work in the GHR.72 There 
are partnerships to disseminate improved cookstoves among 
the rural poor (e.g. Partnership for Clean Indoor Air, Global 
Alliance for Clean Cookstoves) and to improve urban air quality 
(e.g. Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities).73
While there are a few sustained regional processes on air 
quality or climate change within the GHR, there are substantial 
sub-regional water arrangements. The most comprehensive 
watershed mechanism in the area is probably the Agreement for 
the Cooperation on the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin.74 This agreement provides a broad framework for 
information exchange, dialogue, and cooperation “in all fields of 
sustainable development, utilization, management and conserva-
tion of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin 
. . . .”75 Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam are both parties 
to the agreement and members of the associated Mekong River 
Commission (“MRC”).76 It is important to note that although the 
Mekong originates in China and flows along the Myanmar border, 
neither China nor Myanmar is party to the treaty.77 Despite this, 
both countries do participate in annual meetings, and China has 
been exchanging data with the commission.78
Additionally, China and India maintain agreements to share 
data on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej/ Langquin-Zangbu Rivers.79 
In 2006, they established a Joint Expert Level Mechanism 
on Trans-Border Rivers.80 To date, the two governments have 
discussed GM but have struggled to conduct even limited 
academic information sharing regarding these rivers.81
India has other bilateral mechanisms for two of the most 
populated river areas: the Agreement on Sharing the Ganges 
Waters between Bangladesh and India and the Indus Treaty 
binding India and Pakistan.82 However, nearly all the bilateral 
river agreements in the region focus on dams, hydroelectricity, 
and/or water diversion projects, and do not attempt integrated 
water resources management or address broader sustainable 
development objectives.83
ImprovIng governance
pRevention thRough Regional aiR quality 
management
Despite some preliminary regional and international discus-
sions and efforts to address Himalayan GM issues, opportunities 
for cost-effective preventive action are being lost due to a lack 
of investment in research and dissemination of analysis on the 
complex causes of GM. Specifically, emerging research on the 
role of regional air pollution, particularly black carbon, must be 
further developed if regional actors are to take action to slow 
glacial retreat.84
Black carbon abatement programs could have dramatic and 
immediate effects upon reducing GM and respiratory disease, 
while also contributing to global warming mitigation objec-
tives.85 In practice, this means reducing the burning of biomass 
from slash and burn agriculture and cookstoves, as well as 
reducing diesel and certain other types of fuel combustion.86 
And while the countries that are most likely the leading sources 
of emissions—China, India, and Nepal—do not necessarily need 
other countries in the region to act on black carbon reduction, 
they would nonetheless benefit from a concerted effort to coor-
dinate investments, conduct joint monitoring and assessments, 
and exchanging best practices in black carbon abatement and 
adaptation to GM.87
International efforts to address black carbon pollution have 
recently emerged as UNEP, ICIMOD and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency held a consultation on regional black carbon 
mitigation in Kathmandu in March 2011.88 After three days of 
consultation, the groups concluded that available, cost-effective 
methods and technologies are available to reduce black carbon 
pollution.89
In February 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
announced the formation of a Climate and Clean Air Coalition 
to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (“Climate and Clean 
Air Coalition”).90 In the press release unveiling this initiative, 
the State Department notes that “reducing black carbon is 
particularly important to address climate change in snow- and 
ice-covered regions such as the Arctic and the Himalayas.”91 At 
the opening event, Bangladesh Minister of Environment Hasan 
Mahmud highlighted the negative climatic impacts of black 
carbon on crop yields, food security, and freshwater supply for 
the Himalayan region.92 Currently Bangladesh is the only Asian 
country among the six governments that joined the new Climate 
and Clean Air Coalition, but it is possible that other GHR coun-
tries will become involved in this initiative in the future.93
finding foRums that fit
A complex problem such as GM requires integration of 
hybrid mechanisms and a polycentric approach that links global, 
national, and local policy.94 Networks must be mobilized among 
the private and public sectors, starting with the crucial “science-
policy interface — interaction that facilitates public policy 
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development based upon sound and current scientific understand-
ing.”95 Regional cooperation is essential to accomplish the most 
pressing initial task: the rapid development of an authoritative 
region-wide assessment.96
ICIMOD can provide the forum needed to accomplish this 
task. ICIMOD’s sustainable development focus enables it to draw 
connections between GM and related concerns. ICIMOD also 
provides a bridge for science-policy exchanges and has played 
a pioneering role in sounding the alarm on GM and dissemi-
nating information.97 However, the modest amount of financial 
resources and low level of political commitment it has received 
have prevented it from attaining the scale required to generate 
large-scale results.98 Water, climate, and environmental law 
researcher Katak Malla suggests that ICIMOD might play a role 
in developing a more holistic regime, including support for the 
negotiation of “a comprehensive hydro-climate treaty.”99 While 
engaging ICIMOD in negotiations risks diverting the organiza-
tion’s attention away from the technical and capacity-building 
work through which it has been most productive, increasing 
commitments to ICIMOD as a communication forum may be the 
best investment for responding to GM.100
While eight nations within the GHR watersheds and are 
affected by GM are not included in the ICIMOD, the fact that 
the Center’s membership includes India, China., and the other 
mountain nations, combined with its proven track record on GM 
research and awareness-raising, makes it far more applicable 
as the core structure for cooperation on GM than the alterna-
tives.101 For example, SAARC also has a very broad scope, 
which touches upon climate change and water but generally 
emphasizes economic integration and trade.102 Unlike ICIMOD, 
SAARC is used as a forum for ministerial-level gatherings and 
thus offers the potential for India and its neighbors to engage in 
high-profile joint efforts.103 However, the lack of full participa-
tion by China is a major weakness of SAARC as an instrument 
for comprehensive collaboration on GM.104 Efforts by the 
India-based Strategic Foresight Group and the World Bank’s 
South Asia Water Initiative, including the informal Abu Dhabi 
Dialogue Group, complement ICIMOD in building regional 
collaboration.105
Progress is most likely to occur within a forum that focuses 
directly on GM, that brings together China, India, and as many 
of the other GHR countries as possible, and receives substantial 
political support and funding. If this is not possible under the 
ICIMOD, creating a new “Himalayan Glacier Commission” 
that includes as many GHR countries as possible and convenes 
high-level leadership could move GM up the policy agenda, 
develop more targeted programs, and inform national and local 
responses. Given the synergies with other development issues, a 
new GM initiative might be more likely to receive support, and 
be more effective, if situated under a “Himalayan Cooperation 
Council” with a broader mandate. New efforts, then, should 
build strategically upon ongoing projects through ICIMOD and 
SAARC and complement them as necessary.
Proposing a high-level regional initiative on what has been a 
relatively obscure and technical issue may seem unrealistic con-
sidering the intense political tension in the area and competition 
for attention to issues that are deemed more pressing. Yet as the 
glaciers retreat, the cost of inaction increases.106 Spurring col-
laboration between India and China may be politically difficult, 
but cooperation between the two major powers could achieve 
results that would substantially benefit themselves as well as oth-
ers.107 Furthermore, the creation of a new regional mechanism 
could begin to pinpoint the sources of harmful emissions and 
the areas most vulnerable to the changes in hydrology. It would 
raise GM’s profile and provide a forum for concerned stakehold-
ers, including non-state actors who can catalyze further political 
momentum and provide practical efficiencies to the advantage of 
all affected countries.
concLusIon
IELP provides a framework for policy-makers who take 
the threat of GM seriously, whether or not they are concerned 
about compliance with international law. The duty to prevent 
pollution that causes transboundary damage and the importance 
of conducting environmental assessments points toward the 
potential for regional black carbon reduction to slow the melting. 
But there is a current incongruence between GHR ecosystem, 
national jurisdiction, and regional mechanisms. Enhanced coop-
eration through existing regional entities, or even establishing a 
new body to focus on Himalayan GM, could produce effective 
mitigation and adaptation efforts.
The principles and laws discussed in this article can provide 
the fundamental basis for regional cooperation. International 
and regional frameworks cannot substitute for political will, 
but they can stimulate and facilitate engagement by interested 
private and public individuals and organizations. Science also 
calls for more focus on the ABCs in the Himalayas as the 
atmospheric brown clouds have emerged as a significant cause 
of GM and the affected countries have much more capacity 
to reduce their regional air pollution than they do to control 
global warming.
Applying basic principles of IELP could generate positive 
economic, environmental, and social outcomes in a situation that 
seems to be deteriorating faster than what used to be known as 
“a glacial pace.” More detailed research that explores implemen-
tation of the approaches proposed here could prove valuable. 
Given the mounting evidence about the causes and severity of 
glacial decline, the time is ripe for decisive action.
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5 Although the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 authorized the creation 
of the Acid Rain Program, a cap-and-trade program to reduce the amount of 
sulfur and nitrous dioxide, the first cap-and-trade program in the United States 
was California’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market that began in 1993. 
Compare u.s. envtl. pRot. agenCy, an oveRview of the Regional Clean aiR 
inCentives maRket (ReClaim) 1 (2006) (stating that RECLAIM was started 
in 1993) with Acid Rain Program, epa.gov (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.epa.
gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (stating that the Acid Rain Program 
began in 1995). See also Clean aiR aCt amendments of 1990, 42 u.s.C. 
§§ 7651-51o (1990) (authorizing the use of a cap-and-trade scheme to limit 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide); Justin Gerdes, Cap and Trade Curbed 
Acid Rain: 7 Reasons Why It Can Do The Same For Climate Change, foRbes 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/justingerdes/2012/02/13/cap-and-
trade-curbed-acid-rain-7-reasons-why-it-can-do-the-same-for-climate-change/ 
(discussing the history of the Acid Rain Program).
6 See Cap and Trade Program, CalifoRnia envtl. pRot. agenCy aiR Res. 
bd., http://arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) 
(describing California’s cap-and-trade program which started on Jan. 1, 2012).
7 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17 § 95981 (West 2012) (listing the requirements 
for offset credits); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17 § 95994 (listing the sector-based 
offset requirements).
8 See Rob Curran, Carbon Offsets: Q&A, wall st. J. (Sept. 21, 2001), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204683204574356303122443192.html.
9 Voluntary markets do not have a single set of requirements, but use various 
industry standards to assure the quality of the carbon credits. See Voluntary 
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Offset Market, eCosystem maRketplaCe, http://www.
ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/web.page.php?section=carbon_
market&page_name=otc_market (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
10 Compare Regional gReenhouse gas initiative model Rule Subpart 
XX-10 (Dec. 31, 2008) (listing the requirements for offsets in the RGGI) with 
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17 §§ 95981–94 (listing the requirements for offsets in 
California’s cap-and-trade market).
11 See Compliance Offset Program, CalifoRnia envtl. pRot. agenCy aiR Res. 
bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (last visited Mar. 
9, 2012) (listing California’s offset programs).
12 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17 § 95802(a)(12) (West 2012) (defining an offset 
credit as a compliance instrument); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17 § 95820(c) (stating 
that a compliance instrument “does not constitute property or a property right”).
13 See Markus W. Gehring & Charlotte Streck, Emissions Trading: Lessons 
From SOx and NOx Emissions Allowance and Credit Systems Legal Nature, 
Title, Transfer, and Taxation of Emission Allowances and Credits, 35 E.L.R. 
10,221–22 (2005) (analyzing how the Fifth Amendment will require the 
government to compensate regulated companies whose sulfur dioxide allow-
ances are revoked under the cap-and-trade Acid Rain Program); see also 136 
Cong. ReC. S16,980 (1990) (statement of Sen. Baucas) (“[T]he reason for char-
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